Summary of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice By David Galula Summary written by Brett Reeder, Conflict Research Consortium Citation: Galula, . WARFARE. Theory and Practice. David Galula. Foreword by John A. Nagl. PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era. Praeger Security International. Westport. operations citing David Galula’s theory. In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and. Practice, Galula sets a clear mark for planning future COIN.
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While the book is primarily concerned with insurgency, it often refers to both revolutions and plots gaoula well. Conclusion While insurgencies often fail on their own accord, “Relying on counterrinsurgency Indirect action consists of either co-opting the insurgent’s cause, or addressing the weaknesses of the state. According to Galula, this coordination can be achieved through committees and integrated military-civilian hierarchies but, “more than anything else, a doctrine appears to be the practical answer to the problem of how to channel efforts in a single direction” p Counterinsurgency “in the Cold” As long as an insurgency’s activities remain “on the whole legal and nonviolent,” p 43 the insurgency is referred counterinsurgejcy as “cold”.
Skip to main content. Army Command and General Staff College. This requires political programs aimed at placating the insurgent’s base. The first law is that the population is paramount. Guidelines for Using Beyond Intractability resources. His strategy is divided into eight steps: Views Read Edit View history.
A free and open online seminar that takes a complexity-oriented approach to frontier-of-the-field issues dwvid to intractable conflict. Indeed ,as Galula put it, “Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.
David Galula — was a French military officer and scholar who was influential in developing the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare. Though potentially quite effective, such action can backfire and anger the general gwlula. The development of these programs requires a coordination of efforts on the part of the counterinsurgency.
It is still considered by many to be the “Bible” of counterinsurgency warfare. In Aprilcounterinsurgwncy was captured by Chinese Communists during a solo trip into the interior.
wargare He visited the Philippinesand counterineurgency the Indochina War without taking part in it. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved from ” https: Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 33, Iss 5, p. What you do matters, and support can be lost if your actions are unfavorable to the population.
The “Laws” According to Galula, there are four “laws” of counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgents hold a virtual monopoly on tangible assets, such as material resources and legitimate power. At the heart of this political machine is the development of a counterinsurgent cause to compete with the insurgent cause. Please Support Our Fundraising Drive.
This “compass” is comprised of the laws and principals of counterinsurgency warfare, and corresponding strategy and tactics. That is, the response necessary to eliminate wadfare insurgency is likely to be seen as excessive by the general population.
Theory and Practice is highly suggested reading counterinsrgency students of the U. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. They can act directly on the insurgent leaders, they can act indirectly on the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency, they can infiltrate the insurgent movement, or they can reinforce their own “Political Machine”. Establish contact with the population and control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerillas Destroy the local insurgent political organizations Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.
After living as a civilian in North Africahe joined the I Corps of the Army of the Liberation, and served during the liberation of Francereceiving a wound during the invasion of Elba in June Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. As such, the first area should be viewed as a test area vounterinsurgency which policy is adapted to the reaction of the population. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerillas.
Destroy the local insurgent political organization. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. The asymmetric nature of this relationship requires the successful counterinsurgency to capitalize on its tangible advantages and limit the insurgent’s ability to benefit from its intangible advantages.
Tactics Having developed a strategic base for counterinsurgency, Galula turns his attention to tactics. The older soldier imparted an intellectual approach to military and geopolitical analysis.
Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.
Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. There he continued his warm relationship with Jacques Guillermazan officer from an old French military family with whom he had served in France. Those willing to actively support a counterinsurgency operation should be supported in their efforts to rally the relatively neutral majority and neutralize the hostile minority.
David Galula – Wikipedia
That is, the support of the people is the primary objective of a counterinsurgency campaign. He distinguished himself by applying personal tactics in counterinsurgency to his sector of Kabylieat Djebel Mimoun,  near Tigzirteffectively eliminating the nationalist insurgency in his sector and earning accelerated promotion from this point.
Having attained the davir of the population it is imperative to remember that this support is conditional. Such programs are often based on reason, and will be relatively ineffective in the early stages of an insurgency when “passion is the prime mover,” but as the conflict progresses and the pragmatic implications of the war become the “the prime mover,” rational programs which improve the lives of the populace will become highly persuasive.
Summary of “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”
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